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I’m Doing the Best I Can (for Myself): Leadership and Variance of
Harvesting in Resource Dilemmas




Previous research on social dilemmas has shown that leadership can be an effective
means to supervise a common resource and that group members prefer a leader when
confronted with high variance between group members’ harvests. In this article, the
authors investigate how leaders and followers react to variance. The results of an
experimental study indicate that leaders are especially likely to harvest more than
followers (and to deviate from the optimal harvest) when there is high variance between
group members’ harvests. Moreover, this role effect was explained, at least partly, by
the fact that compared with followers, leaders felt more entitled to higher harvests. The
findings suggest that assigning leadership may, under certain situations, lead to inef-
ficiency in managing the common resource.
Keywords: leadership, resource dilemma, entitlement
Hardin (1968) described in his article “The
Tragedy of the Commons” a situation in which
herdsmen share a common pasture in which
their cattle are allowed to eat the fresh grass.
Each herdsman tries to keep as many cattle as
possible on the commons in order to maximize
his own profits. However, when one herdsman
decides to add more cattle to the pasture, the
collective shares the consequences, because
fewer resources are then available for the other
herdsmen. Yet consequences will be severe
only when other herdsmen also add more cattle
to the commons, which results in the overgraz-
ing of the pasture and no grass left for the cattle
of any herdsman. Hence, a defecting choice,
such as adding more cattle to the pasture, will
always result in a higher payoff than coopera-
tion, but if all act in this way, all will be worse
off than if they cooperate (Dawes, 1980). These
particular situations are known as social dilem-
mas and, more specifically, resource dilemmas
(Komorita & Parks, 1994).
In social dilemmas, the installment of a
leader is a preferred solution to enhance coop-
eration and to supervise the use of the common
resource pool. However, to date, little empirical
research is known to have addressed the behav-
ior that leaders posit in these kinds of situations.
Prior resource dilemma research has demon-
strated that leaders are believed to constitute an
efficient and fair way to maintain resources
(Messick et al., 1983; Rutte & Wilke, 1984). In
fact, group leaders are expected to act in a
responsible and just manner serving the group’s
interests (Samuelson & Messick, 1995). How-
ever, more recent research has shown that lead-
ers may actually take more from the resource
than followers do (De Cremer, 2003; De Cre-
mer & van Dijk, 2005; Samuelson & Allison,
1994). For example, De Cremer (2003) argued
that this role effect was due to the fact that
leaders felt more entitled to receive larger
shares from the resource. This entitlement ex-
planation relates closely to different research
approaches. For example, social cognition re-
search suggests that the position one has in a
group activates certain role schemas, which
hold interrelated cognitions, such as thoughts,
beliefs, and attitudes (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).
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On one hand, the leader role schema holds that
a leader should act in a responsible manner, but
on the other hand, it comprises the belief that a
leader should receive certain privileges and en-
titlements (Messick et al., 1983; Samuelson &
Allison, 1994). Moreover, equity theory (Ad-
ams, 1965), which states that people’s outcomes
should be in relation to their inputs, also em-
phasizes the role of entitlement. Because lead-
ers generally must make important decisions
and are considered to be more influential, their
inputs are expected to be higher than followers’
inputs. Leaders thus find themselves entitled to
receive a higher payoff than followers and ac-
tively pursue this goal.
But is this always true? Will leaders always put
their own interests first? In our opinion, people are
more likely to behaviorally adhere to their given
roles when there is an ambiguous harvesting
norm, that is, when the resource situation at hand
fails to dictate clear expectations and social norms.
Indeed, if group members harvest in a clear and
consistent manner, a strong situation emerges in
which it is clear how normative one’s behavior
should be. However, if the situation is weak and
norms are not clear because people’s harvests are
highly variable, people will rely more on their
own beliefs and feelings of entitlement. Hence,
leaders’ harvests relative to followers’ harvests
will be influenced by the expected differences in
feelings of entitlement only when the situation is
more ambiguous and not when a clear harvesting
norm exists.
It is interesting to note that prior social di-
lemma research has exactly shown that under
circumstances in which there is high variance
between group members’ harvests (Samuelson
& Messick, 1986; Samuelson, Messick, Rutte,
& Wilke, 1984), people prefer to install leaders.
Indeed, resource dilemma research has demon-
strated that the greater the variance in group
members’ harvests is, the more people will in-
crease their harvests. The resulting inefficient
use of the common resource may then require a
structural change. However, when group mem-
bers keep their harvests close to a norm, such as
the highest harvest one can take in order to
maintain the resource pool from depleting, con-
formity pressures will be strong, and harvests
will remain close to this norm (see, e.g., Mes-
sick et al., 1983; Samuelson, 1993; Samuelson
& Messick, 1986; Samuelson et al., 1984).
The purpose of the present study was to in-
vestigate how leaders versus followers think
and act when confronted with high- versus low-
variability harvesting groups. To summarize our
hypotheses, first, we expected that leaders
would recognize their influence to the group
(see equity theory) and would reason that they
have a greater impact on the group decisions
than followers do. Second, we expected leaders
to indicate that they are entitled to harvest more
than followers. Third, we expected leaders to
harvest more than followers when the variance
in group harvests is high. No such difference
was expected when variance is low. Finally, this
role effect under circumstances of high variance
was expected to be mediated by feelings of




Ninety-two undergraduate students participated
voluntarily in exchange for 7 euro (approximately
U.S. $6). All participants were randomly allocated
to the experimental conditions of the role manip-
ulations and variance manipulations.
Procedure
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were
welcomed by the experimenter and then placed
in separate cubicles containing a chair, a table,
and a computer. Further instructions were pre-
sented on the computer screen. Participants were
led to believe that they would be interacting via
the computer, which was connected to a general
server (in reality, participants were not able to
interact and communicate with each other).
Participants were told that they were part of a
6-person group that would play several trials of
a game.1 Group members were referred as
Group Members 1 to 6 (in reality, all partici-
pants learned that they were Group Member 2).
Further, participants learned that they would be
playing a fixed number of trials and that in each
trial they could take a certain amount of points
1 For some sessions, fewer than 6 people arrived to par-
ticipate. Regardless of how many individuals actually ar-
rived for each session, however, participants were led to
believe that 6 participants had arrived. This procedural
detail is consistent with that used by others (see Kerr &
Kaufman-Gililand, 1994).
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from a common resource pool. Participants
were told that the initial pool size was set
to 1,500 points. In each trial, participants would
be able to simultaneously harvest a certain
amount of points from the resource pool. How-
ever, participants learned, each group member
could harvest up to 50 points. At the end of each
trial, the points that were left in the resource
pool would be multiplied by a replenishment
factor, 1.1, so that the pool size was constrained
to a maximum of 1,500 points (see, e.g., Sam-
uelson & Messick, 1986; Samuelson et al.,
1984). Participants were told that they could
continue to harvest points from the resource
pool as long as the pool contained more than
zero points or until the experimenter stopped the
experiment. Hence, if each group member were
to take an amount of points equal to the optimal
harvest, 22.72 points (hence 23 points, because
participants were only able to take whole
points), the initial pool size could be kept stable.
If group members were to harvest in a re-
sponsible manner from the resource pool, they
could harvest for a long time. For group mem-
bers this would be particularly interesting, be-
cause each point harvested would increase per-
sonal income and was worth 0.05 euro (U.S.
$0.04). The total of harvested points would be
paid after the experiment. After this introduc-
tion, participants were questioned regarding
their understanding of the game. All partici-
pants answered these questions successfully.
Appointing a leader. Participants were told
that in groups where decisions must be made
there is often a leader and that, hence, in this
situation a leader would be appointed. To ap-
point a leader in a legitimate manner, the person
who scored highest on a questionnaire assessing
leadership qualities would be appointed leader
of the group. Participants filled out the self-
developed 26-item Management Assessment
Inventory, consisting of such items as “Leader-
ship is a matter of influencing others” and “A
leader should be able to command respect.”
After a short interval, participants received bo-
gus feedback about the results of the inventory.
Participants in the leadership condition learned
that in the remainder of the experiment, Group
Member 2 (i.e., the participant) would perform
the leader role in the group. Participants in the
follower condition learned that Group Mem-
ber 5 would be the leader and that they would be
followers. Then participants were asked a few
questions concerning their role in the group.
Manipulation of variance. Participants next
started playing the resource dilemma game. In
two trials, group members could withdraw a
number of points from the resource pool. Af-
ter the first trial, participants were told, group
members’ individual withdrawals would be
shown, and hence, each group member would
be able to see how much each other member
had harvested. In reality, however, after the
first trial, group members’ individual harvests
were manipulated. Half of the participants
learned that the harvests of the other five
group members were low in variance. The
other half learned that the other group mem-
bers had harvested in a high-variance behav-
ioral pattern. Harvests after the first trial were
manipulated in such a way that the mean
would be equal to the optimal harvest and
equal across experimental conditions. How-
ever, in line with Samuelson et al. (1984), the
standard deviations between the low and high
conditions were different. The standard devi-
ation (based on the other five group members’
harvests) in the low-variance condition was 3
points. In the high-variance condition the
standard deviation was 14 points. After the
first trial, participants saw the following har-
vests from the other group members in the
low-variance condition: 19, 21, 24, 24, 27. In
the high-variance condition participants saw
the following harvest sizes: 6, 14, 23, 31, 41.
Hence, participants in the low-variance con-
dition saw that the other group members’
harvests were close to the optimal harvest,
whereas those in the high-variance condition
saw that group members’ harvests were
highly divergent and that participants were
unequally harvesting from the common re-
source pool.
Dependent measures. All questions were
answered on a 7-point scale (ranging from 1 
not at all to 7  very much so). First, to check
for the manipulation of variance, participants
were asked to what extent there was high vari-
ance in the harvesting behavior in the group; to
check for the manipulation of role, participants
were asked whether they had been assigned the
role of leader or follower in the group (dichot-
omously scored).
Then, to assess feelings of entitlement, par-
ticipants were asked, “To what extent do you
think you have the right to earn more than the
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others?”2 Further, participants were asked how
much impact they thought they had on the
group. Finally, participants’ harvests were mea-
sured in a first trial (before harvest feedback




A 2 (role)  2 (variance) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on the variance manipulation check
item revealed only a main effect for variance,
F(1, 88)  58.77, p  .001, 2  .40. Partici-
pants in the high-variance condition thought
there was more variance in harvesting behavior
(M  4.83, SD  1.61) than participants in the
low-variance condition (M  2.52, SD  1.24).
For the role manipulation (leader vs. follower)
question, 91 of 92 participants (99%) answered
correctly. Hence, our manipulations were
successful.
Impact on the Group
A 2  2 ANOVA on the impact item showed
only a main effect for role, F(1, 88)  4.85, p 
.05, 2  .05, showing that leaders thought they
could exert more influence on the group
(M  4.41, SD  1.34) than followers
(M  3.78, SD  1.38).
Feelings of Entitlement
A 2  2 ANOVA on the entitlement measure
item revealed a main effect for role, F(1,
88)  17.30, p  .001, 2  .16. Leaders
thought they had the privilege to earn more
(M  3.96, SD  1.76) relative to followers
(M  2.54, SD  1.55). However, an unex-
pected main effect for variance was also found
(low variance: M  3.61, SD  1.78; high
variance: M  2.89, SD  1.75), F(1,
88)  4.46, p  .05, 2  .05. However, note
that the effect size for variance was relatively
weak and the effect size of role relatively
strong. Moreover, the manipulation of variance
had not been introduced yet, and as such we
believe that the effect for variance can be attrib-
uted to chance.
Harvesting Behavior
To test for the effects of role and variance and
the mediating role of entitlement on harvesting
behavior, several regression analyses were per-
formed (Baron & Kenny, 1986). First of all, the
effects of role and variance were regressed on
the harvests in Trial 2 (as feedback about other
members’ harvests was only then known),
thereby controlling for the effect of Trial 1,
showing an effect for Trial 1 (  .71, p 
.001), a main effect for role (  .16, p  .05),
and an interaction effect between role and vari-
ance (  .15, p  .05; see Figure 1). A simple
slope analysis demonstrated that there was an
effect of role in the high-variance condition
(  .31, p  .005), showing that leaders har-
vested more than followers. However, no effect
in the low-variance condition was found be-
tween leaders and followers (  .02, p  .86).
Then, to test whether leaders harvested more
than followers in the high-variance condition
because of feelings of entitlement (see De Cre-
mer, 2003), the same regression analysis in the
high-variance condition was performed (but this
time we added entitlement as a covariate). This
analysis showed that the effect of entitlement
was significant (  .22, p  .01) and, more
important, that the effect of role was reduced
(  .20, p  .01). A Sobel test (Sobel, 1982)
showed that this reduction was significant
(z  2.17, p  .05).
Moreover, additional analyses showed that
followers’ harvests in the high-variance condi-
tion were close to the optimal harvest (23
points), t(19)  –1.64, p  .12, whereas lead-
ers’ harvests deviated significantly from the op-
timal harvest, t(21)  2.14, p  .05.
General Discussion
The present research examined situations in
which leaders harvest more from a common
2 It is better to include the mediating variable before the
dependent measure rather than after. It is indeed noted that
“the very term ‘mediator’ (or ‘intermediate variable’) sug-
gests that the mediator stands between that which it medi-
ates and the outcome” (Kraemer, Stice, Kazdin, Offord, &
Kupfer, 2001, p. 850). We followed this suggestion to
examine the potential mediating effect of the covariate
entitlement. It is interesting to note that a previous study by
De Cremer (2003) showed role effects similar to those we
hypothesized when no questions with regard to possible
mediating variables (such as entitlement) were asked.
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resource than followers. In line with our predic-
tions, we found that those occupying the role of
leader harvested more than those occupying the
role of follower, but only when harvesting be-
havior within the group was high in variability.
Moreover, this effect could be explained at least
partially by feelings of entitlement. In the fol-
lowing paragraphs we discuss the findings and
their theoretical implications.
The most important finding was that harvest-
ing behavior of leaders was a function of the
variability in harvesting behavior within the
group and feelings of entitlement. This is im-
portant because earlier resource dilemma stud-
ies (a) have advocated the appointment of a
leader as an essential structural solution to
maintain resources and (b) have shown that
especially in situations where there is a lot of
variation between group members’ harvests,
leaders were a preferred solution (Samuelson &
Messick, 1986; Samuelson et al., 1984). The
present results (and very recent research; De
Cremer, 2003; De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005)
show that leaders may not be such a successful
solution, because they may harvest even more
than followers. However, this negative leader
behavior seems to emerge only when the situa-
tion does not reinforce a clear behavioral norm
that group members are assumed to adopt, a
norm that is particularly absent when there is
high variability in the group’s harvesting behav-
ior (see Samuelson et al., 1986, for a similar line
of reasoning about harvesting norms and vari-
ability). Hence, when a leader’s influence is
strongly needed (when there are unequal har-
vests among group members), leaders refrained
from intervening; in contrast, they were more
eager to harvest more from the common re-
source. The present study is among the first to
experimentally show that leaders may engage in
more self-interested behavior than followers,
and it is the first, to our knowledge, to point out
when this is most likely to happen. Future re-
search might focus on other situational vari-
ables that allow leeway for leaders to harvest
more than followers.
An important reason that leaders engage in
such self-interested action is that they feel more
entitled to receive a larger share from the re-
source (see also De Cremer, 2003). Leader roles
indeed include a belief that one is entitled to
obtain more resources than those occupying a
follower role (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Equity
theory also suggests that leaders are entitled to
more, because they will presumably have higher
inputs and as such should receive higher out-
puts. This latter reasoning implies that leaders
should be more aware of their influential role
within the group, and our results supported this:
Leaders believed they had more impact on the
group. Taken together, it thus seems that lead-
ers’ feelings of entitlement go hand in hand with
perceptions of having much impact on their
followers. If this is the case, more self-inter-
ested behavior should emerge.
It is essential to note that leaders in the high-
variance conditions deviated from the optimal
harvest by harvesting more than the optimal
harvest. This observation is in sheer contrast
with prior research findings pointing out that
leaders should be able to take care of a fair
distribution of outcomes (see, e.g., Rutte &
Wilke, 1984) and, hence, should be a “model”
for the other group members in order to set a
norm for the group to follow. This idea of
modeling has been recognized in the charis-
matic leadership literature, in which it is argued
that, for example, leaders engaging in self-sac-
rificing acts (leading to high perceptions of cha-
risma) can be seen as serving as a role model for
cooperative behavior (see De Cremer & van
Knippenberg, 2002; Yorges, Weiss, & Strick-
land, 1999). Therefore, leaders are often con-
sidered to exert influence when they lead by
example, such as being fair and cooperative in
social dilemmas. Does this mean, however, that
followers will never consider it appropriate that
leaders feel entitled to take more? In our view,
followers might accept leaders to take more if
they see the leader as someone who has done
more than others, consequently reinforcing per-
ceptions of justification (see also van Dijk &
Figure 1. Harvesting behavior as a function of role and
variance in harvesting.
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Wilke, 1993). Thus, in general, leaders are seen
as representative of fair and just behavior, but in
keeping with this idea, if justified, leaders may
take more than others (cf. equity theory; Adams,
1965).
Moreover, the optimal harvest can be consid-
ered a coordination rule that, if followed, en-
sures efficient use of the resource. Research by
van Dijk and Wilke (1996, 2000) showed that
people tacitly coordinate their decisions and in
resource dilemmas are prone to follow an equal-
ity rule. Such coordination rules (like optimal
harvest) can thus be perceived in terms of both
fairness and efficiency, and the present results
seem to indicate that leaders violate both of
these principles. It should be noted that in pre-
vious research, participants occupying a leader
or follower role were the first to take from the
resource, a scenario that does not represent the
traditional resource dilemma, in which partici-
pants harvest simultaneously. However, the
present research showed that the role effect also
emerged when group members make decisions
at the same time.
To conclude, the fact that leaders violate
these principles might have negative conse-
quences for the collective. As a result, followers
might want to leave the group or even take
retributive actions on the leader (Fitness, 2000).
Therefore, organizations should be aware of
whether situations are present in which leaders
might violate both fairness and efficiency prin-
ciples. It is important to organize these situa-
tions in such a way that leaders will take re-
sponsibility and create circumstances to prevent
the violation of these principles.
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